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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: TOWARD A THIRD
WAY OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
PaulNolette*

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether constitutionally recognized socio-economic
rights' are judicially enforceable remains a hotly debated issue throughout the world as the number of socio-economic guarantees appearing in
national constitutions continues to grow. Much of this debate, however,
is conducted on a purely theoretical level since judicial precedent
speaking to the issue is remarkably thin. This lack of judicial precedent
has made it difficult to predict how judicial enforcement might actually
work in practice.
Recently, however, South Africa's Constitutional Court has decided
a number of significant cases that provide important insight into the
judicial enforceability of socio-economic rights. The South African
constitutional system, as an "administrative law model of socio-economic rights," 2 presents a "novel and highly promising approach to judicial
protection of socio-economic rights." 3 This is because the approach
"answers a number of questions about the proper relationship among
socio-economic rights, constitutional law, and democratic deliberation." 4 In particular, the Court's approach "promote[s] a certain kind of
deliberation, not [] preempting it, as a result of directing political attention to interests that would otherwise be disregarded in ordinary political

* B.A. 2001, Saint Anselm College. The author is a third-year law student at
Georgetown University Law Center. After graduation, he will join the law firm of Nelson,
Kinder, Mosseau & Saturley in Manchester, New Hampshire. I would like to especially thank
Professor Mark Tushnet for his invaluable help in developing and improving this manuscript.
Additionally, I would like to thank Cindy Marcotte, John Paul Verderese, Jonathan Isaacs, and
my parents for all of their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. "Socio-economic rights" are those rights concerned with protecting the basic
necessities of life, such as health care and housing.
2.

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNINGDEMOCRACY: WHATCONSTTUTIONSDO 234(2001).

3.
4.

Id. at 236.
Id. at 233.
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life."5 The insights provided by the South African system contribute
greatly to bridging the gap between theory and practice.
This note builds upon Professor Cass Sunstein' s observations that the
structure of the South African Constitution, coupled with the important
decisions of the Constitutional Court in Government of the Republic of
South Africa and Others v. Grootboomand Others6 (hereinafter Grootboom) and Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others7 (hereinafter TAC), offers a workable solution to the
problem of the judicial enforceability of constitutionalized socio-economic rights.8 The South African system provides a rejoinder to those who
claim that enforceability of socio-economic rights gives the judiciary far
too much power (and that it is ultimately unworkable) by presenting an
example of a system that offers a vast improvement over other existing
schemes aimed at the enforcement of constitutional socio-economic
rights.
Part I contrasts the South African system with other constitutional
systems by briefly examining the constitutional structure of the United
States, which provides for no explicit socio-economic rights, and that of
Hungary, which explicitly provides for a large number of such rights.
The analysis examines some of the more common criticisms received by
both systems. Part II briefly outlines the South African constitutional
arrangement and then moves into a description of the key elements of
the Grootboom and TAC cases. Part III analyzes how the Court, by
means of the constitutional system described in Part HI, has navigated
between the difficulties presented by the two options that are contrasted
in Part I. The section demonstrates how the Court has created a "third
way" of judicial enforceability of socio-economic rights that, due to the
presence of self-imposed limits, promises a solution that is both sensible
and workable.

5. Id. at 235.
6. South Africa. v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) [hereinafter Grootboom].
7. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC)
[hereinafter TACJ.
8. See SUNSTErN, supra note 2.
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I. SocIo-EcONoMIc RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND HUNGARY
CONSTITUTIONS

This section briefly examines two approaches to the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights that reflect two extremes in the current
thinking on the subject. One approach provides for no judicial enforcement of such rights at all, while the other provides for judicial enforcement of a number of socio-economic rights, without limitation. In order
to facilitate this examination, I consider the Constitution of the United
States as an example of the former approach and the Constitution of
Hungary as an example of the latter.' These approaches provide a
recognizable contrast to the South African system.
A. The American Approach
The United States Constitution provides for no socio-economic rights
explicitly in its text, such as the right to welfare or health care. While
some scholars have suggested that it is possible to find socio-economic
rights in the U.S. Constitution using particular interpretations of the
text, ° the Supreme Court has consistently rejected such notions.'" The

9. Note that the United States and Hungary are offered here only as examples of
opposing approaches to socio-economic rights provided in a national constitution. There are a
number of countries that have taken similar approaches to either the U.S. or Hungary. For
countries taking positions similar to the US approach, consider the United Kingdom. S, see
generallyElizabeth Palmer, Resource Allocation, Welfare Rights-Mappingthe Boundariesof
Judicial Control in Public Administrative Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STuD. 63 (2000). For
countries taking positions similar to Hungary, consider a number of other Eastern European
nations, including Poland. S, see generallyWiktor Osiatynski, Social and Economic Rights in
a New Constitutionfor Poland, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST COMMUNIST-APPLICATION 242
(Andrds Saj6, ed., 1996). South Africa's system is an innovative system that departs from the
apparent conventional wisdom, as exemplified by the above countries, that socio-economic
rights must be constitutionalized generally without specified limitation, or not at all.
10. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Right Casefor a ConstitutionalRight
to Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REv. 525, 536 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare
Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 (1979); Frank I. Michelman,
Forward: On Protecting the PoorThrough the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7
(1969); Charles A. Reich, IndividualRights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1964-65); William J. Rich, Taking "PrivilegesandImmunities" Seriously:
A Call to Expand the ConstitutionalCanon, 87 MINN. L. REv. 153 (2002).
11. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court's Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 CHAP. L.
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U.S. Constitution instead operates on the assumption that the rights
included there are "negative" rights requiring only that the government
restrain itself from interference with the rights of an individual.
Negative rights are distinguished from socio-economic rights in that
socio-economic rights obligate the government to take "positive" action.
Constitutional scholars have noted a number of problems with the
United States' approach. First, the approach relies on a tenuous distinction between "positive" and "negative" rights. As many have noted, the
protection of "negative" rights, which include civil and political rights
such as the right to vote and the right to privacy, requires positive
government action just as socio-economic rights do.' 2 The right to vote,
for example, requires the government to act positively to prevent interference with the voting process by nongovernmental actors. 13 In addition, interpretations of negative rights by the courts have resulted in the
forcing of governments to expend public funds, such as requiring
governments to provide for legal aid services in order to achieve the
right to a fair trial.' 4
Other scholars have suggested that the United States' approach of
excluding socio-economic rights reflects an outdated approach to constitutionalism. 5 The U.S. Constitution has been in continuous force
since 1789 with very few textual changes, and it certainly did not anticipate the industrialization of the nation and subsequent calls for greater
"positive" obligations on the State. Constitutional law in America has
been uniquely slow to acknowledge the changes in economic and social
circumstances since the late 18th century, in sharp contrast to more
recent constitutional developments in Europe and elsewhere. 6

REv. 137, 150 (2003) ("The United States Supreme Court has rejected socio-economic rights
claims in cases with varying facts and legal grounding.").
12. See Mark Tushnet, CivilRightsandSocialRights: The Futureofthe Reconstruction
Amendments, 25 LOYOLA OF LA L. REv. 1207, 1214 (1992).

13.
14.

Id.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

15. See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism:18th to 20th
Century, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 311, 318-21 (1989); see also Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in
Twentieth Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHi. L. REV. 519, 525-26 (1992).

16. Casper, supra note 15, at 311, 318-321 (noting that even 18th and 19th century
European conceptions of the state allowed for greater positive duties than does the U.S.
Constitution).
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B. The Hungarian Approach
Hungary's Constitution, in contrast to the U.S. Constitution, specifically provides for a large number of socio-economic rights. For
example, the Hungarian Constitution specifies a right to "an income that
corresponds to the amount and quality of work [citizens] carry out,"' 7
and a right to a "healthy environment."' 8 Hungary's system illustrates an
approach that represents, at least textually, a "rights on demand" system.
It operates under the assumption that socio-economic rights are, and
should be, enforceable by courts.' 9
Hungary's approach has been criticized by a number of scholars who
maintain that the constitutionalization of socio-economic rights is untenable. Such criticism is targeted not only at Hungary's specific system,
but at the project of including socio-economic rights in constitutions in
general. One oft-repeated criticism is that courts lack the institutional
capacity required to adequately enforce socio-economic rights.2' This
argument says, in its most basic form, that courts simply are not up to
the task of determining what types of policies are needed to deal with a
particular socio-economic problem. Legislatures, not courts, the argument goes, should deal with these types of issues: "Courts lack the tools
of a bureaucracy. They cannot create government programs. They do not
have a systematic overview of government policy.' This is particularly
true in a system such as Hungary's, where the lack of limitations on the
rights listed in the Constitution makes it very difficult for courts to
actually enforce them.22
This argument is supported by reference to a "polycentricity" problem
that arises in the enforcement of socio-economic rights, as noted by Lon
Fuller.23 The thrust of this problem is that every change in policy has a
17. HUNG. CONST. art. 70B, sec.§ (3).
18. Id. art. 18.
19. See Id. art. 70K ("Claims arising from infringement on fundamental rights, and
objections to the decisions of public authorities regarding the fulfillment of duties, may be
brought before a court of law.").
20. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
FederalRationalityReview, 112 HARV.L. REV. 1131, 1175 (1999); see also Frank B. Cross,
Institutionsand Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1529, 1598 (2000).
21. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 1131, 1175.
22. See Antonio Carlos Pereria-Menaut, Against Positive Rights, 22 VAL U. L. REV.
359 (1988).
23. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978).
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number of unforeseen consequences that go along with it. A change in
the price of aluminum, for example, may change the demand for steel
or plastic.24 The fact that this occurs illustrates the institutional limits of
the adjudicative power of the courts, because "polycentric" problems
can only be addressed through simultaneous resolution of multiple
issues. Since many of those issues are not placed before the courts in
any one case, it is difficult for courts to engage all of the issues at once,
as a legislature might be able to do. The "polycentric" problem raised by
the attempted enforcement of socio-economic rights is a valid criticism,
given the complexity of the underlying issues undergirding claims
brought on the basis of such rights. Courts are simply not equipped to
deal with all of the issues involved.25
Another criticism raised against the Hungary type approach points to
a relative absence of manageable standards determining the content of
socio-economic rights. Frank Cross, for instance, argues that positive
rights are by their nature indeterminate, as opposed to negative rights.26
The reason for this, he explains, is that positive rights are "consequentialist, requiring the judiciary to create a program that achieves a given
result. ' 27 This is in contrast to negative rights, which "simply regulate
particular actions or conduct., 2' The consequentialist nature of positive
rights would be a problem even assuming a "neutral" judiciary, and certainly a major problem with the "far more likely" scenario of ideologically motivated judges enforcing their policy preference.29 With no
manageable standards from which to base their decisions, conservative
and liberal judges alike will dictate policy outcomes based on what
policies they think are best, which in turn may not be the policies that
best help the intended beneficiaries of the positive rights sought.3°

24. Id. at 394.
25. Craig Scott and Patrick Macklern, ConstitutionalRopes of Sand or Justiciable
Guarantees?Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 24
(1992) ("The resistance to constitutionally entrenched social rights on grounds of institutional
competence is often summarized in the view that social rights.. .involv[e] complex, polycentric,
and defuse interests in collective goods.").
26. Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 901-02
(2001).
27. Id. at 901.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 906-07.
30. Id. at 920-921.
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Such indeterminacy of positive rights may also lead simply to judicial
non-enforcement. Wiktor Osiatynski cites a number of positive rights
found in the Hungarian Constitution, including the fundamental right of
children to "the care of their family,"'" that constitute indeterminate,
unenforceable rights.32 Rights such as the right to "care" seem not to be
rights at all, he argues, because of the vague and ill-defined nature of
their terms.33 Given this supposed impossibility of enforcement of socioa matter of moral norms and
economic rights, many "will remain forever
34
law."
the
than
rather
customs
social
A third criticism is that by giving the court the ability to enforce
socio-economic rights, it distorts the separation of powers between the
judiciary, legislature, and executive.35 The ability to enforce socioeconomic rights gives the judiciary, the argument goes, "the power of
the purse," a power normally granted exclusively to the legislature.36
Giving such power to the judiciary "constitute[s] a serious setback for
the forces of democracy and the sovereignty of the people,"37 because
the judiciary is less representative and accountable to the people than is
the legislature.38
A final criticism 39 is that a system of enforceable socio-economic
rights can cripple a government by requiring vast expenditures of
HUNG. CONST. art. 67, § 1.
Osiatynski, supra note 9, at 242.
Id. at 370.
Id.
See David Beatty, The Last Generation: When Rights Lose Their Meaning, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 350 (David M. Beatty
ed., 1994) (arguing that the ability to enforce socio-economic rights would give the judiciary
"the power of the purse," a power normally exclusively afforded the legislature).
36. Id. at 350.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The criticisms listed here are not intended as an exhaustive list of all possible
criticisms, but rather they include the most important general concerns about enforcement
indicated by the current scholarly debate. Other criticisms not mentioned here include: the
likelihood of public resistance to increased welfare payments and the consequent political
difficulty ofjudicial enforcement, see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique,88
MICH. L. REv. 2271, 2341 (1990) (noting that court orders requiring monetary outlays "would
then be faced with the undeniably difficult task of obtaining funding from the legislature to
implement this duty and of obtaining executive enforcement of its order"); the problem of
making socio-economic rights dependent on litigating in court, which may be too difficult and
expensive for the very people the rights are meant to help the most; see Cross, supra note 26,
at 862; and the observation that conservatives generally dominate the judiciary and court
adjudication of these issues should therefore not be normatively attractive to those on the Left;
see Cross, supra note 26, at 863.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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government funds.' There are simply not enough resources available,
especially in relatively poor nations like Hungary and South Africa, to
enforce a right to "the highest possible level of physical and mental
health," as the Hungarian Constitution does for everyone living within
its territory. 4' Also, if there is only a limited amount of resources to go
around, the enforcement of socio-economic rights predetermines a
significant part of the state budget, thereby constraining political options
in the elected branches.42
In general, the criticisms highlighted above can be thought of as falling into two broad categories. The first two criticisms, regarding institutional competence and manageability standards, ask whether courts can
act to enforce constitutional socio-economic rights, while the latter two,
concerning the separation of powers and the implications of enforcement for the distribution of a state's financial resources, asks whether
courts should act to enforce these rights. 43 Both sets of criticisms
overlap and the possible responses to them should therefore be related
as well. The South African response provides such a method, for it
presents a means of enforcement that addresses these criticisms through
a unified approach, or a "third way." It does so by incorporating provisions for socio-economic rights directly into the text of its Constitution, unlike the American Constitution, while overcoming some of the
problems inherent in the "unlimited" approach exemplified by the
Hungarian Constitution.
II. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND THE

ENFORCEMENT OF SoCIO-EcONoMIc RIGHTS

South Africa has a long history of internal ills, compounded by its
bleak experience with apartheid and its current battles with AIDS and
poverty." When South Africa's chief legislative body, the South African
Congress, began work on a new South African Constitution, it did so
with this history in mind, and in so doing set out to develop an instru-

40.

See Osiatynski, supra note 9, at 262.

41.

HUNG. CONST. art. 70D, §1.

42.
43.

Id.

See PAUL HUNT, RECLAIMING SOCIAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 25 (1996).

44. See Suzanne Daley, At Inauguration,Mbeki CallsforRebirthof South Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1999, at A3.
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ment that would deal with these problems. The decision to utilize such
a correctional approach as a motivational compass can be thought of as
a "pre-commitment strategy."45 This strategy dictates that constitutional
design should "work against those aspects of a country's culture and
traditions that will predictably produce harm through that country's
ordinary politics."' The Constitution's Preamble suggests such an
objective by making an indirect reference to the South African people's
continued struggle to rise above apartheid.47
Adopted in 1996, the final text of the Constitution guarantees both
civil and political rights, such as the right to privacy48 and the right to
freedom of religion,49 as well as a number of provisions that set forth
socio-economic guarantees. These guarantees pertain to housing,5"
health care,5 ' and children's rights,5" among several others.53 In addition
to guaranteeing the right to have access to these goods, including food,
water, and social security,54 the Constitution also requires the state to
"take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of th[ese] right[s]."55
The courts were given the ability to "grant appropriate relief' to anyone
alleging that their rights had been infringed upon or threatened.5 6 For
those who support the placing of socio-economic rights in a constitu57
tional document, the South African Constitution was a success.

45. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 226.
46. Id.
47. The first lines of the Preamble read:
We, the people of South Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past; Honour those
who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; Respect those who have worked to
build and develop our country; and Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live
in it, united in our diversity.
S. AFR. CONST., Preamble.

S.AFR. CONST. ch. 1, § 14.
ch. 1, § 15.
49. Id.
ch. 1, § 26.
50. Id.
48.

51.
52.
53.

54.
55.

Id.ch. 1, § 27.
See id.ch. II, § 28.
See, e.g., id.ch. II, § 29.
See S. APR. CONST. ch. II, § § 26(1), 27(1).
Id.
ch. II, §§ 26(2), 27(2) (The operative language is substantively the same in both

sections).
56.
57.

See id.
ch, II, § 38.
See Scott, supra note 25.
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In the same year that the new Constitution was adopted, the Constitutional Court touched upon the question, in a certification decision, of
whether the newly constitutionalized socio-economic rights would be
enforceable.58 Faced with the argument that these socio-economic rights
were not justiciable, and therefore not enforceable by the courts, the
Court responded "we are of the view that these rights are, at least to
some extent, justiciable.... At the very minimum, socio-economic rights
can be negatively protected from improper invasion."' 9 Nonetheless, the
question of how the enforcement of socio-economic guarantees would
actually work in practice remained unanswered until June of 2000, when
the Constitutional Court announced its ruling in Grootboom. In that
decision, the Court held, for the first time, that section 26 of the Constitution, ensuring the "right of access to adequate housing," required the
legislature to take further action to address pressing housing concerns. 60
In holding as it did, the Court set forth a framework by which the
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights could function in a
substantially different way from the two systems outlined in Part I.
The plaintiffs in Grootboom were 510 children and 390 adults who,
as a result of intolerable conditions in their previous squatter settlement,
had illegally occupied vacant private land. After occupying the land, the
plaintiffs subsequently found themselves evicted and left homeless.6 '
Many of the plaintiffs had applied for subsidized low-cost housing from
the municipal government, but when it became clear that the government had no response forthcoming, they were left with no choice but to
occupy the privately held land.62 Following the eviction proceedings, the
plaintiffs returned to their previous settlement only to find that it was
now occupied by others,63 forcing the plaintiffs to build temporary
housing that consisted mostly of plastic sheeting.' The court-appointed
attorney for the plaintiffs demanded that the municipal government meet

58. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
(10) BCLR 1253 (CC). The justicibilityjusticiability of the socio-economic rights in the South
African Constitution was finally crystallized in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZuluNatal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC), discussed infra, Part II (C).
59. See id. 178.
60. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) U 93-96.

61.

See id.

62.
63.
64.

Id. 8.
Id. 9.
Id. 11.
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its constitutional obligations by providing temporary accommodation to
the plaintiffs,65 but the plaintiffs charged that the municipality's subsequent response was inadequate.66 The plaintiffs then brought suit against
the government, claiming that their ight to housing under Section 26(2),
and their children's right to shelter under Section 28(1)(c) had been
violated by the government's inaction. 6' After a decision in the High
Court favoring the plaintiffs on both claims, the government brought an
appeal to the Constitutional Court.6 s
The appeal gave the Court an opportunity to specify how the courts
should enforce the socio-economic rights guaranteed in the Constitution,
while respecting the limitations requiring the state only to "(a) [] take
reasonable legislative and other measures; (b) within its available
69
resources; (c) to achieve the progressive realization of the[se] rights.
The Court noted that enforcement, admittedly a difficult proposition,
7°
was something that must happen on a case-by-case basis. To this end,
it is necessary, the Court continued, to examine the rights embodied in
the Constitution both in terms of the textual setting of the rights and in
their social and historical context.7 For example, the state's obligation
to provide for access to adequate housing "may differ from province to
province, from city to city, from rural to urban areas and from person to
person. 72 In terms of "reasonableness," a state housing program must
be "balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision for attention
to housing crises and to short, medium, and long term needs" and it
must not exclude "a significant segment of society."" Additionally,
measures must "respond to the needs of the most desperate," and
"cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of the
right they endeavor to realise."74

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) I1, n.10.
Id. 13.
Id.
Id. 21.
Id. 20.
Id. 22.
Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 37.
Id. 43.
Id. 44.
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In regard to the Section 26 housing claim, the Court determined that
"[t]he housing situation is desperate ' 'T and that the government's program, while laudable for its medium and long-term objectives, "leaves
out of account the immediate amelioration of the circumstances of those
in crisis.'" The right of access to adequate housing requires more than
just "bricks and mortar"-it requires land, services, and a dwelling.77
Because of the program's failure to provide these goods "for those in
desperate need," the Court declared that the government failed to meet
its obligations under Section 26 of the Constitution.78
Turning to the Section 28 claim regarding the rights of children, the
Court noted that a "rights on demand" interpretation of Section 28
would produce an "anomalous result," allowing persons with children
to use their offspring as "stepping stones" to receive housing while
shutting out those without children, regardless of the severity of their
circumstances.79 The correct interpretation of Section 28, the Court
explained, is not that it provides "housing on demand" for children and
parents, but that it imposes a primary obligation on the parents or family
to provide for Section 28 goods, "and only alternatively on the state,"
such as in cases of orphaned children who no longer have families to
provide for them.8" The Court added that this does not relieve the state
of its obligations to children who do have families. Such children still
retain the right to access that is embedded in other provisions.8
The Constitutional Court, substituting the High Court's order with its
own, 2 thus declared that the state's housing program fell short of its
constitutional obligation and was not reasonable.83 In its holding, the
government was required to "devise and implement within its available
resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme progressively
to realise the right of access to adequate housing." Although the Court
had thereby imposed a judicially enforced obligation on the legislature,
75. Id. 59.
76. Id. 64.
77. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 135.
78. Id. 66.
79. Id. 71.
80. Id. 77.
81. Id. 78.
82. The High Court's order had included an order that, under Section 28 of the South
African Constitution, the applicant children were to be 'provided with shelter," which the
Constitutional Court saw as an order for "housing on demand." See id. 70.
83. See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 199.

Lessons Learned From the South African ConstitutionalCourt

2003]

103

it qualified its decision by clarifying that "the precise allocation [of the
84
national housing budget] is for national government to decide, and
gave the state general leeway in the development of a housing program
that would fall within the Court's guidelines.
In the recent TAC case, the Court continued and amended the
85
Grootboom framework of the justiciability of socio-economic rights.
The TAC holding focuses further the role of the courts in the constitutional system. In TAC, the Court makes it clear that the socio-economic
rights in the Constitution do not create a free-standing "minimum core"
of rights (an issue left somewhat vague in Grootboom), while demonstrating that the Court's use of reasonableness standards apply to
existing government programs as well as to government inaction of the
sort in Grootboom.86
TAC, like Grootboom, involved a government appeal from the High
Court's interpretation of a socio-economic rights provision in the Constitution that was unfavorable to the government.8 7 Unlike Grootboom,
however, where the applicants brought suit because of government
inaction, the applicants in TAC took issue with an ambitious legislative
8
program devised to deal with mother-to-child HIV transmission. The
provided for a limited distribution of Nevirapine,
government program
89
an HIV inhibitor. The applicants argued that the limited distribution of
Nevirapine, confined to only two sites in each province rather than being
made generally available,90 violated constitutionally mandated access to
health care services,9 ' children's rights to basic nutrition and health
care, 92 and the government's obligation to take "reasonable" measures
"within its available resources" to achieve the "progressive realization
of each of these rights." 93 Thus, the Court considered whether measures
adopted by the government to provide access to health care services for

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. 166.
See TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) TI 34-39; Id. 25.
See TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at TI 34-39; Id. 1 25.
See id. 2.
See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); see also TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC); Id. 4.
Id. 10.
S. AFR. CONST. § 27(1).
Id. § 28(1).
Id. § 27(2).

(CC).
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HIV-positive mothers and their newborns fell short of its obligation
under Sections 27 (right to health care) and 28 (rights of children). 94
The government's justification for the unavailability of Nevirapine
at non-research hospitals, where facilities existed only for testing and
counseling, included: (1) a concern that Nevirapine would not be
effective, 95 (2) that the administration of Nevirapine would lead to future
resistance to the drug in later years, 96 (3) that the drug might be unsafe, 97

and (4) concerns over government budget constraints. 98 The Court dismissed each of these concerns one by one, concluding that the government' s policy failed to address the urgent needs of mothers and newborn
children who did not have access to the research hospitals. 99 The Court
also noted that there was a comprehensive policy for testing and
counseling of HIV-positive pregnant women, but that the policy was not
implemented uniformly.'0° Given that HIV/AIDS is "the greatest threat
to public health in [South Africa],"'' the government's policy of
restricting the use of Nevirapine to research sites, and its lack of provision for the extension of testing and counseling facilities throughout
the public health sector was not "reasonable."' 10 2 To that end, the Court
required the government to devise and implement a new "comprehensive and coordinated programme" to provide access to health services
for pregnant women and their children.'0 3
The South African constitutional system has taken seriously the need
to enforce socio-economic rights. At the same time, it has set a number
of limits, appearing both in the text and in the interpretations of that
text, that help to define and restrict the power of the judiciary in relation
to the other branches of government. The next Part examines why this
system may well be the best devised thus far to ensure a sensible system
of judicial enforcement of constitutional socio-economic rights.
94. See id.TAC I 3 (The applicants in the High Court were members of civil society
concerned with the medical treatment of HIV-positive mothers and the prevention of the
transmission of HIV to the children through breastfeeding).
95. TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC); Id. 51.
96. Id. 52.
97. Id. 53.
98. Id. 54.
99. Id. 67.
100. TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 90.
101. Id. 93.
102. Id. 95.
103. Id. 135.

2003]

Lessons Learned From the South African ConstitutionalCourt

105

Ill. SOUTH AFRICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF

SocIo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS

The Constitutional Court of South Africa has developed a sensible
and feasible framework for the judicial enforcement of socio-economic
rights that may serve to help South Africa rise out of its apartheid past.
While this is certainly a bright achievement for South Africa itself, this
framework may also provide a workable model for the rest of the world.
By establishing a number of important constraints on the scope of the
judiciary's enforcement powers that are derived from the text and judicial interpretations of the Constitution, the South African system
navigates a "third way" between the opposing models discussed in Part
I. These constraints arise out of a limitation on the number of socioeconomic rights enumerated in the Constitution and the generalized
nature of those rights, the requirements set forth in the text of the Constitution that the legislature need only "progressively" pursue "reasonable" policies, and the Court's own acknowledgement of its limitations
combined with its pragmatic of reasonableness standards. These limitations, considered in turn below, have helped to construct a workable
system for the enforcement of socio-economic rights that not only
answers the practical questions of how courts can enforce these rights,
but also addresses the more theoretical concern over whether courts
should enforce these rights.
A. Limited Number of Enumerated Rights and Lack of Specificity
A limitation in the number of rights enumerated in the Constitution
provides an inherent limit on the Court's power to enforce socioeconomic rights. Additionally, those that are enumerated are far less
specific than those contained in the constitutions of several Eastern
European nations, especially that of Hungary. Unlike Hungary's Constitution, which provides "a truly dazzling array of social and economic
rights""° including "leisure" and a "healthy environment," the South
African Constitution lists only a few. Also, the level of specification

104. Cass R. Sunstein, Against PositiveRights, in WESTERN RIGHTS?POST-COMMUNIST
APPUCATION 225 (Andr s Saj6 ed., 1996).
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found in the Hungarian Constitution °5 is much higher than that found
in the more generalized language of the South African Constitution,
leaving the definition of rights such as the right to "sufficient food" and
"adequate housing" rather loose.
A number of commentators have advocated for the inclusion of many
highly detailed rights in a constitution as an appropriate response to the
imprecision of social rights." The problem with this approach, however, is that it leads to an enforcement scheme that binds the hands of
future legislators regardless of whether the policy actually makes sense
in a given time and place. The unworkability of a particular constitutionally-mandated program may very well lead to the legislature taking
no action at all despite the express constitutional language to do so. In
such cases, the courts would likely be reluctant to actually enforce such
rights, knowing that their decisions could not and would not actually be
followed. 107
South Africa's system is different in this regard because it sets forth
generally defined rights, such as "access to adequate health care," that
ultimately allow the legislature a wider berth in which to work unencumbered by judicial interference. The flexibility in the Constitution
also gives the courts the ability to develop the kind of flexible system
highlighted in this Note. Generally defined rights have allowed the
Court to largely overcome the "manageable standards" concern, mentioned in Part I above, by allowing the legislature room, within certain
limits, to specify the manner in which these general obligations can be
developed into manageable policies. As the Court noted in TAC, "[t]he
government has always respected and executed orders of this Court,"
and one main reason for this probably lies in the fact that the Court has
never required the government to perform a task that it cannot possibly
accomplish.

105. See A MAYGAR K6ZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA (MKA) [Hung. Constitution] art.
70B (stating that there is a right to an income "that corresponds to the amount and quality of the
work they carry out").
106. See, e.g., HuNT, supra note 43.
107. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 229-30.
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B. The Distinction Between "Access" to Rights and the Rights
Themselves
The language setting forth the socio-economic rights enumerated in
the South African Constitution consists of two main components: first,
that "everyone has the right to have access to" the specified right; and
second, that "the State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of' the right or rights. The characterization of socio-economic
rights as "rights of access," rather than general rights in and of themselves, 10 8 such as the "right to employment," contrasts with the sort of
"rights on demand" constitution exemplified by the Hungarian Constitution.' 09 Framing the right to socio-economic goods as a right to "access"
rather than to the right itself is an additional way of delineating the outer
boundaries of the role of the courts in the area of socio-economic rights
enforcement. In other words, the Court is free to enforce all listed socioeconomic rights but it is not free to provide unlimited "rights on
demand" without regard to the actual circumstances of the individual(s)
seeking relief.
Some may argue that providing for socio-economic rights by means
of a qualified "access" standard makes them lesser rights in comparison
to rights not similarly qualified." However, this suggestion has less
force when one considers that framing the rights as "access" rights
actually assists the realization of such rights by placing the relative
needs of individuals in context. In the Grootboom housing scenario, for
example, this meant that the appropriate response of the Court in regard
to those most unable to help themselves was to require the State, within
certain limits, to provide material goods including land, dwellings, and
services. This approach acknowledges that for the poorest citizens, legal
access to the underlying good by itself is not true access, since their
socio-economic position forecloses actual access to such goods in the
marketplace. In regard to those who can afford their own housing, the

108. See Grootboom, 2000(11) BCLR 1169 (CC)1 35.
109. For example, the South African Constitution includes a "right to freedom of
religion." S. AFR. CONST. § 15(1). The South African Constitution also includes the right "to
form a political party." Id. § 19(1).
110. Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa's Evolving Jurisprudenceon Socio-Economic
Rights (2002), at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/research.php.
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appropriate response is not "rights on demand" but rather a requirement
that the state "unlock[] the system" and provide access to housing stock.
In this way, the "right of access" acknowledges that individuals and civil
society share some obligation with the State in ensuring that citizens'
socio-economic needs are met.
C. The "Within Available Resources" Provision
The first of three provisions attached to the enforceability of the
"qualified" rights in the Constitution is the "within available resources"
provision. This provision ensures that courts take budgetary limitations
seriously, and that they enforce socio-economic rights only with the
relevant political and economic realities in mind. In Soobramoney v.
Minister of Health, "' a case decided three years prior to Grootboom,
the Court demonstrated its willingness to take the "within available
resources" provision seriously. The case also illustrates the manner in
which the provision helps to constrain the courts.
Soobramoney was brought by a forty-one year-old unemployed man
suffering through the irreversible final stages of chronic renal failure." 2
Regular treatments of renal dialysis, which requires a dialysis machine
and a total of six hours of care per treatment, could have prolonged his
life, 1 3 but a state hospital refused treatment on the grounds that the
treatment could be given on a limited basis only, due to its high cost and
the limited availability of supplies at the hospital.' 14 The man sued the
hospital, claiming that the hospital's refusal of treatment violated the
constitutional guarantee of his "right to life""' 5 and his right not to be
' 16
refused "emergency medical treatment."
The Court, taking note of the negative wording of section 27(3)'. and
the fact that the applicant's injury was "an ongoing state of affairs"
rather than an "emergency,"' 8 emphasized the necessity of limits on the
enforcement of the kind of socio-economic rights raised in the case,

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).
Id11.
Id.
Id.
Id.; S. AFR. CONST. § 11.
Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC); S. AFR. CONST. § 27(3).
See S. AFR. CONST. § 27(3).
Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 1 21.
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specifically the "right not to be refused emergency medical treatment."
In this case, "an unqualified obligation to meet [the] needs" indicated in
Section 27 would "not presently be capable of being fulfilled," given the
"lack of resources and the significant demands on [those resources]." 9
The Court explained that because South Africa is a relatively poor
nation with a Constitution recognizing a number of other socio-economic rights, "[t]here will be times when [managing limited resources]
requires [the State] to adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs of
society rather than to focus on the specific needs of particular individuals within society."120 This opinion suggests that when the state argues
that it Cannot pursue a certain socio-economic policy due to financial
constraints, the Court is required to give such an argument due consideration.
The "within available resources" provision also helps to ensure that
the socio-economic rights in the Constitution do not become a form of
"rights on demand" that are handed out with no regard to budgetary circumstances. This is in contrast to the system in Hungary where there is
no comparable financial limitation on the enforcement of socio-economic rights. The lack of such a provision in Hungary has led to the
Hungarian courts' reluctance to enforce the socio-economic rights in
their constitution, since forcing the government to supply something it
simply cannot provide is seen to be largely meaningless.
The "within available resources" provision has the added effect of
helping realize South Africa's national commitment to assist the neediest members of its society. Enforcing rights such as health care and
housing require substantial financial outlays, and a "rights on demand"
system would, if enforced, quickly drain the nation's treasury. By
limiting the ability of the courts to divert the nation's scarce resources,
it helps ensure that there will be enough resources available for the
poorest citizens.
An objection to the inclusion of a financial limitation is that it might
allow the legislature to determine the extent of its own obligations set
forth in the constitution by simply adopting a smaller budget. This is a
serious concern that has yet to be directly addressed by the South
African Constitutional Court. At this point, it appears the Court would
be reluctant to interfere with a legislative move to lower tariffs, for
119.
120.

Id. 11.
Id. 31.
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example, that would ultimately result in a smaller governmental budget
within which to work. However, basic separation of powers doctrine
suggests that it is appropriate to restrain the judiciary from commanding
tax increases, for instance, or to block policies that result in lowering
government cash inflows. This seems especially true when considering
the alternative, which would allow the judiciary to determine the
"reasonableness" of a tax decrease or tariff cut rather than the "reasonableness" of an existing government program-something perhaps not
impossible to do, but likely more difficult. In any case, the TAC Court
recognized that the judiciary's role is not in "rearranging budgets,"
though it may make orders that have budgetary implications.' 2 ' While
some may be concerned that the government may use the available
resources provision to define the scope of its own obligations, such discretion is likely a necessary component in a system that respects the
relative authorities of each branch and properly limits the role of the
judiciary.
D. The "Progressive Realization" Provision
Sections 26, 27, and 28 require the government to achieve the "pro22
gressive realisation [sic]" of the rights spelled out in those sections.
As the Grootboom Court explained, "[t]he term 'progressive realization'
shows that it was contemplated that the right could not be realised
immediately."'' 2 In other words, the provision allows the government to
take some time in implementing proposals. Quoting the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the
Court noted that progressive realization provision is "'a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties
involved for any country in ensuring full realization of economic, social
and cultural rights." '' 124 By adopting for the South African Constitution

121. See TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 38.
122. As the Grootboom court notes, this term was borrowed from international law,
specifically from Article 2(1) of the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The
Court used the committee's analysis to guide its reasoning in the Grootboom. See Grootboom,
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 145.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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the CESCR's requirement 25 that its progressive realization provision
"'be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d'etre,
of the [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights] "' and that "'any deliberately retrogressive measures.., be fully
justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the
Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available
resources,"' the Court in Grootboom recognized the need to allow the
legislature the necessary time required to design adequate socio-economic programs.121
This contextual approach, allowing the government to enact even
facially retroactive measures if it means better future compliance with
the Constitution, is far better than an immediate "rights on demand"
system. Such systems fail to consider inherent difficulties of such an
approach, including the necessity for legislative fact-finding and appropriate policy-shaping-actions that take substantial time to perform
adequately. Without the "progressive realization" provision, South
Africa would likely be left with a legislature forced to quickly enact
legislation in order to adhere to judicial mandate, leading to hastily
developed programs that suffer from lack of foresight regarding longterm consequences, poor wording, and other unforeseen problems. The
provision allows the legislature to consider socio-economic remedies in
greater detail and encourages, in turn, the enactment of better legislation. For advocates of the enactment of real, meaningful, and workable
socio-economic policies, this balance is critical.
E. The "Reasonableness" Provision
Perhaps the most important limit, used in conjunction with the other
limits discussed above, is the judiciary's use of "reasonableness"
standards. One might think that the introduction of such a vague term
into a constitution is a recipe for disaster, since it can easily lead to judicial overreach. While such a concern may never be eliminated entirely
as long as judicial review exists, the way in which the South African
Constitutional Court has interpreted "reasonableness" is hopeful. In

125. See id. ("Although the committee's analysis is intended to explain the scope of
states parties' obligations under the Covenant, it is also helpful in plumbing the meaning of
'progressive realisation [sic]' in the context of our Constitution.").
126. Id.
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particular, the Grootboom and TAC cases shed some light on the manner
in which reasonableness standards may be used in a way that does not
compete with the legislature's policymaking authority. These cases also
shed light on the analogous nature of other types of reasonableness
standards that are employed by courts on a regular basis.
In order to give content to what "reasonable" policies are, the court
looks to the problems at hand "in their social, economic and historical
context" as well as the context of the bill of rights as a whole.'27 For
that reason, the Grootboom Court undertook an inquiry into the applicants' housing problems, and the TAC Court looked into the problems
of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. By bringing this kind of focus to the
inquiry, the Court is better able to determine on whom to place the
burden of providing the socio-economic good in question---civil society,
the individual herself or, if necessary, the State.
This interpretation of the "reasonableness" provision allows the legislature to maintain its wide policy-setting jurisdiction. The TAC Court
recognized, and many constitutional scholars agree,' 28 that courts are
institutionally limited when it comes to the "wide-ranging factual and
political enquiries" inherent in policy-making.' 29 Heeding this insight,
the role of the courts is simply to make suggestions for possible policy
alternatives that in general only constrain the government's options
within a certain range, rather than directing any one particular outcome.
By limiting itself to this function, the Constitutional Court in South
Africa has in large measure overcome the criticisms of "polycentricity"
and institutional competence discussed in Part I of this Note.
Nevertheless, the use of reasonableness standards may worry those
concerned over the judiciary's competence to even touch upon areas that
require specialized knowledge.13 0 However, the tools the Constitutional
Court has at its disposal to determine reasonableness are not out of line

127. See id. 143.
128. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Thin Constitutions and the Good Society, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1989, 1990 (2001) ("[Positive] rights come wrapped with questions ofjudgment, strategy, and responsibility that seem well beyond the reach of courts in a democracy.").
129. See TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 37.
130. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Forward:A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 33 (2002) ("[A] judge should beware evaluating
complex polycentric questions of economic or social policy that require specialized expertise
and knowledge and that may rely on assumptions concerning issues with which he or she is
unfamiliar.").
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with those employed by other courts at different times and in other
contexts. As Professor Sunstein has noted, the Court has constructed an
"administrative model" of socio-economic rights, a model used by a
number of courts to determine the reasonableness of bureaucratic implementation of legislative enactments. Additionally, taking some examples
from the United States, court decisions in areas as diverse as racial
discrimination, 3 1 obscenity, 132 and shareholder rights,'33 all delve into
areas requiring specialized knowledge of social and economic data.
By not interfering with the legislature's broad control over program
specifics, the court refrains from going into details which it has no
competence to consider. Just as courts do all of the time, it needs only
to look at the available data brought to it to determine reasonableness.
Fact-finding will be done by the parties to the case-meaning that the
government is able to make its case using available data that the court
is not required to generate.
Still, there may be some concern that even if the Court's result in
Grootboom is acceptable, the way in which the TAC Court used the
"reasonableness" standard crossed the line into judicial overreach by
prescribing a particular policy outcome (requiring that the government
make Nevirapine available nationwide) to the legislative branch, instead
of simply requiring the government to come up with any reasonable plan
that would combat the underlying problem. By doing so, the TAC
decision may have shifted the Court's promising approach in Grootboom to a stronger, and more problematic, form of judicial review.'34
There are, however, at least two responses to such an argument that may
serve to ease such concerns.' 35

131. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
132. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing a definition of
obscenity requiring the court to inquire into whether alleged obscene material has "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
133. See, e.g., Shlensky v. S. Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793 (111. 1960) (holding
corporate directors liable for damages suffered by the corporation for various transactions
because the directors did not establish the "fairness" of the challenged transactions).
134. One scholar recently noted the possibility that the South African constitutional
system, which he considers an example of "weak-form judicial review," might escalate into
"strong-form judicial review" as a result of TAC. He also notes, however, that there is reason
to believe such an escalation will not occur due to the unusual facts surrounding the case. See
Mark Tushnet, New Forms ofJudicialReview and the Persistenceof Rights - andDemocracyBased Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 813, 825-828 (2003).
135. In large part, the response here is also suggested by another scholar (after the High
Court's decision in TAC but before the final Constitutional Court decision). See Heinz Klug,
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The first response is that TAC can and should be read narrowly. This
is so for several reasons. First of all, the Court was faced with a unique
and very sympathetic set of facts in TAC. The case involved a particularly innocent group of injured parties (newborns), 36
' and it involved the
deadly AIDS disease, which is the "'most important challenge facing
South Africa"' today.'37 Undoubtedly, the plaintiffs in Grootboom were
also sympathetic. However, in TAC, as opposed to Grootboom, the
government's arguments were very weak. The government's positions
regarding the efficacy and safety of Nevirapine, as well as its alleged
inability to provide wide distribution of the drug to all regions of the
nation, were sharply undermined by the scientific evidence brought to
its attention, the minimal cost of the drug, 138 and the fact that the
government had already distributed the drug to several other sites. Also,
though it was not mentioned by the TAC Court directly, the intense
negative public reaction to South African President Mbeki's dogged
skepticism toward the causal link between HIV and AIDS may have
helped the Court feel more comfortable with the result it reached in
TA C.139 All of these factors indicate that the Court found it appropriate
to delve into specific policy matters more deeply than it usually would
due to the uniqueness of the factual situation surrounding the case.
Secondly, given that the government had already adopted a policy of
limited distribution of Nevirapine to test sites, the Court's mandate for
a policy of wider Nevirapine distribution can be seen as simply an
extension of an already existing government policy. Indeed, the Court
framed its action as one of getting the non-participating regions in the
nation to follow the participating ones.'" This can be seen as fulfilling
a basic principle enunciated in Grootboom: "[a] programme that
excludes a significant segment of society cannot be said to be reasonFive Years On: How Relevant is the Constitutionto the New South Africa ?, 26 VT. L. REv. 803,
816-818 (2002); see also Tushnet, supra note 134.
136. TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 72. ("In evaluating government's policy, regard
must be had to the fact that this case is concerned with newborn babies whose lives might be
saved by the administration of Nevirapine ...").
137. Id. 1 (quoting a South African Department of Health publication).
138. The cost of the Nevirapine itself was not a factor, as the manufacturer had offered
the drug to the respondents for a period of five years. See id. 48.
139. See Suzanne Daley, AIDS in South Africa, A PresidentMisapprehendsa Killer,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2000, at D4; see also What to Make of Thabo Mbeki?, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 2001, at A22.
140. TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 132.
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able." ' 4' Additionally, the political situation in TAC contrasts sharply
with that in Grootboom, where no government policy had yet been
devised to deal with housing problems in the short-term. This fact led
the Court to refrain from requiring the legislature to follow a policy
created solely by the Court itself.
TAC signified that some involvement by the courts in policy matters,
and perhaps more so when given a narrow set of facts such as those in
TAC, may be appropriate to give efficacy to listed socio-economic
rights. The case also suggests that increased policy direction by the
Court will occur only where the legislature has indeed acted, but has
acted in a such a manner so as to treat similarly situated citizens differently from region to region. That the Court waited to make this point
clear in the "easier" TAC case ("easier" due to the unique circumstances
mentioned above) is not insignificant. The Court was able to accomplish
the dual purpose of demonstrating that the socio-economic guarantees
of the Constitution are to be taken seriously, even in the context of more
"traditional" rights, while simultaneously suggesting that in harder cases
where the legislature has not yet acted, the Court will be less willing to
fix specific policy directives on the government. Where the line should
be drawn determining how much judicial involvement is necessary in a
particular case is something that the Constitutional Court will continue
to develop, and should be closely followed by socio-economic rights
critics and supporters alike.
In short, the Court's approach has worked because it demonstrates the
manner in which the judiciary can enforce "positive" rights while constraining itself to a contextual examination of process. The question is
not, as the Hungarian Constitution suggests, whether the courts believe
that "leisure" has been accomplished or that people are receiving "equal
pay for equal work." Rather, the proper inquiry should be whether the
government's policies allow for the realization of rights. If the applicant
is very poor, then "access" may mean that government needs to do more
than simply "unlock the system" by actually providing socio-economic
goods by a process that is reasonable. With this approach, it is easy to
imagine that if an applicant came to the Constitutional Court in
possession of the personal resources needed to obtain housing, but

141.

Grootboom,2000(11)BCLR 1169 (CC)143.
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lacking the will to use those resources to do so, the Court would require
that she use self-help rather than relying on the State.
F. The "Minimum Core" Argument Rejected
The determination of whether a given policy is "reasonable" does not
depend on whether there is a "minimum core" obligation required of the
legislature. The Court explicitly rejected such an approach in Grootboom and TAC. In so doing, the Court placed a further constraint on the
judiciary's role in the South African system of socio-economic rights.
The minimum core model, presented by two amicus briefs in TAC,
and noted in Grootboom, was developed by the CESCR.'42 Though not
easy to define, the minimum core model requires that the state guarantee
"at least the minimum decencies of life consistent with human
dignity."' 43 The argument in regard to the South African Constitution
was that Section 27(1), providing for "access" to health care, established
a right independent of the limitations in 27(2). The Court rejected this
approach.'" Both the Grootboom and TAC Courts noted that while
particular cases may use a minimum core analysis of a particular
government service in order to determine whether government policies
are "reasonable," "the socio-economic rights of the Constitution should
not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that the minimum core
be provided to them."' 45
One major problem with the minimum core approach is that it does
not take into account the particular contexts present in each country. A
"most pressing need" at a given time and place might be a whole host
of things under the minimum core model, rather than one or two things
that require particular and immediate attention on the part of government. As the TAC opinion noted, "[i]t is impossible to give everyone
access even to a 'core' service immediately"' 46 due to financial limitations.
Additionally, the establishment of a minimum core standard would
require the government to devise policies that provide all citizens with

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See TAC, 2002 (10) BLCR 1033 (CC)

Id. 28.
Id. 39.
Id. 34.
Id. 135.

26.
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socio-economic goods, regardless of social and economic circumstance.
As the Court noted in TAC, when the government limits the supply of
Nevirapine to its test sites, "it is the poor outside the catchment areas of
these sites who will suffer."' 14 7 It is not those who can already pay for the
product who will be hit the hardest. The Court recognized that everyone
is entitled to the socio-economic rights granted in the Constitution, but
it was aware that the distribution of scarce state resources needs to be
limited to those who cannot otherwise afford the goods. In this manner,
requiring access to socio-economic rights, rather than absolute provision
of the rights themselves is, as the Court noted, actually a more progressive policy than a minimum core approach that requires the state to
provide limited resources to everyone regardless of economic circumstances.
Finally, the minimum core approach forces courts to take on the role
of policy-maker rather than concentrating on processes. As mentioned
above, the Court has recognized that it is "not institutionally equipped
to make the wide-ranging factual and political enquiries necessary for
'
determining what the minimum-core standards... should be." The
crux of the Court's observation is that priority-setting should be done by
legislatures rather than the courts, allowing the "restrained and focused"
role of the courts to be that of "requir[ing] the State to take measures to
meet its constitutional obligations and subject[ing] the reasonableness
of these measures to evaluation."' 49 Doing so helps the "judicial, legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate constitutional
balance."150
The South African system as it stands is more flexible and work51
able than it would be if it included a minimum core of rights.' For

147. Id. 70.
148. TAC, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 37.
149. Id. [38.
150. Id.
151. The TAC Court's explicit rejection of the "minimum core" approach nevertheless
has its critics. See, e.g., David Bilchitz, Towards a ReasonableApproach to the Minimum Core:
Laying the Foundationsfor Future Socio-EconomicRights Jurisprudence,19 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTS. 1, 26 (2003) (arguing that the TAC court's approach was "overly cautious"). The minimum
core approach, however, is not the only way to have a "principled strong commitment to
eradicating ... terrible living conditions as soon as possible" and the only "means of specifying
priorities." Id. at 15. The Court's approach after Grootboom and TAC forces the government
to adhere to the constitutional directive of eradicating the legacy of apartheid, by directing the
legislature's attention to problems it may otherwise have ignored. This helps spur action by the
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advocates of socio-economic rights, this system should be normatively
attractive because it can actually work. Though it may initially seem
more attractive to have a highly specified system of socio-economic
rights (as in Hungary), those rights have yet to be actually implemented. "52 Allowing some flexibility in the system helps to ensure that
the other branches of government actually and appropriately meet the
constitutional goal of State assistance to all citizens.
CONCLUSION

South Africa's constitutional system suggests that there is a third way
between providing no socio-economic rights at all, on the one hand, and
"rights on demand," on the other. This third way emphasizes the importance of having the judiciary work with the legislature and executive to
come to the best practical solutions for reaching the aspirational goals
enumerated in the Constitution's preamble. To best reach that end
pragmatically, the structure of the constitution, as interpreted by the
Constitutional Court, places limits on the sphere of judicial enforceability of the socio-economic rights provided for in the text. Those
limits include the enumeration of only a few generally defined socioeconomic rights, a distinction between qualified and unqualified rights,
the realization that the state's resources are limited, the allowance for
the state to take the necessary time required to devise effective policy,
and giving the legislature freedom to pursue a wide range of policy
options in order to solve the nation's social problems, as long as the
policy is "reasonable." These limits are sensitive to the concern that
legislatures, and not courts, are more institutionally competent to devise
and implement particular policies enforcing socio-economic guarantees
The insights gained from an examination of the system of socioeconomic rights enforcement constructed by the South African constitu-

government by letting it know where its constitutional priorities should lie. And, for the many
reasons highlighted in this Note, it does so in a way that squarely addresses the strong criticisms
of judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights outlined in Part I.
152. See Beatty, supra note 35, at 347-48 ("[N]o court has ever stood up to the other
two, elected branches of government and told them that the actual amounts or levels of financial
or cultural support they have provided are inadequate as a matter of constitutional law....
[W]henever claimants have asked a court to second guess the amount of money a Government
has decided to spend on particular social or cultural programmes, they have, without exception,
gone away empty-handed.").
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tional system should not be understated. As one scholar recently put it,
"perhaps it is time for Americans to learn from the South African Constitutional Court's excellent work.""' South Africa's constitutional
system is still a work in progress, but its early promise suggests that at
the very least observers should keep a close eye on the future developments of South Africa's "third way" of socio-economic rights enforcement.

153. Mark S. Kende, The Fifth Anniversary of the South African ConstitutionalCourt:
In Defense of Judicial Pragmatism, 26 VT. L. REV. 753, 767 (2002).

